What is Stephen Law’s X-argument, and how would you respond to it

Framework and Issues

What is Stephen Law’s X-argument, and how would you respond to it?

It is widely acknowledged that humans frequently make errors when ascribing the causation of occurrences to the agency of “concealed agencies” such as magicians, fairies, dwarves, hobgoblins, and mythical divinities. Everybody who is aware of this has the rationale to suspect their own assertions about the presence of concealed agents. As a result, anybody who understands this and appears to believe in concealed agencies as a result of a specific phenomenon does not believe rationally.[1].

An overall reaction to this assertion is that it ignores the reality that the percentage of subjects who testify in favor of T reinforces T’s justification. As a result, believing in one ‘s own encounter and testimony of an X-claim asunder from or in the face of other evidentiary provided may be irrational. However, if a considerable proportion of other subjects assume the identical X-claim and testify to the identical or comparable encounter, it becomes less unrealistic to do so. This is the reason individuals believe numerous eyewitness accounts of the resurrected Jesus more readily than single assertions regarding Jesus showing up to a person.

How does Plantinga address the problem of religious diversity? Do you find his response successful?

Plantinga addresses the problem of religious diversity using the externalist approach. The respect in which religious faith is ‘innate’ here is one that may not be intellectually available to the believer himself because it is exclusively a factor of his intellectual capacities operating properly in suitable surroundings. Plantinga implies that humans consider this natural, innately perception of God a sensus divinitatis, as Calvin did. He considers that externalism is significant in the perspective of the issue of religious diversity.  However, I don’t find this response successful since Plantinga may be incorrect in emphasizing humans’ exact cognitive obligations in his epistemology. Thus, according to Plantinga’s epistemological viewpoints, the epistemic problem presented by religious diversity cannot be adequately addressed in a primarily externalist approach[2].

Bibliography

STEPHEN LAW. “The X-Claim Argument Against Religious Belief – Pre-publication Draft.” Stephen Law. Last modified 2016. https://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2016/07/the-x-claim-argument-against-religious.html.

JULIAN WILLARD. “PLANTINGA’S EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY.” Last modified 2003. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1468-2265.00224.

[1] STEPHEN LAW. “The X-Claim Argument Against Religious Belief – Pre-publication Draft.” Stephen Law. Last modified 2016

[2] JULIAN WILLARD. “PLANTINGA’S EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY.” Last modified 2003.